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Abstract 
 
 
This paper measures the impact of a minimum wage increase on profitability of private 
firms in Vietnam using a difference-in-differences with propensity score matching 
method. Data used for this analysis are from Vietnam Enterprise Censuses in 2005 and 
2006. It is found that the impact estimate of the minimum wage increase in 2005 from 
290 to 350 thousand VND on firms’ profit margins is very small and negative, and not 
statistically significant.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Minimum wages are the lowest hourly, daily or monthly wage that employers are 
required to pay to employees. Increasing minimum wages often leads to controversial 
impacts. Possible positive effects of minimum wages are protection of low income 
laborers, increases in work incentives and productivity, reduction of people covered in 
subsidy programs, increases in consumption, aggregate demand and generation of 
multiplier effects (Freeman, 1995; Dowrick and Quiggin, 2003; Gunderson, 2005). Since 
firms can respond to an increase in labor cost by reducing labor demand or increasing the 
output prices, negative impacts of minimum wage increases can be increased 
unemployment and prices (Hamermesh, 1986; Brown, 1999).  
 The size as well as the sign of the impact of minimum wage increases on 
employment and prices is not consistent in empirical studies. For example, negative 
effects of the minimum wage on employment are found in studies both developed 
countries (Neumark and Wascher, 2002 and 2003; Campolieti et al., 2005; Magan and 
Johnston, 1999; Abowd et al., 1999) and developing countries (Rama, 2001; Gindling 
and Terrell, 2004; Harrison and Scorse, 2005). On the contrary, positive effects on 
employment of minimum wages are found in studies such as Card and Krueger (1994, 
2000), Dickens et al. (1999), Montenegro and Pages (2004), Singell and Terborg (2006).2 
Similarly, strong effects of minimum wages on inflation are found in Card and Krueger 
(1995), Macdonald and Arasonson (2000), but not in Frye and Gordon (1981), Sellekaerts 
(1981), Katz and Krueger (1992), Card and Krueger (1995).3   
Minimum wages can affect profitability of firms in two ways. The profit margins 
of firms are not affected substantially if firms can pass on higher production cost due to 
increased minimum wages to consumers or the firms can reduce the production cost by 
employing fewer workers.  On the contrary, the profit margins of the firms will decreases 
if the higher wage costs are not fully passed or the firms do not reduce their employment 
(Draca, et al. 2008). The effect of minimum wages on firm profitability is a priori 
unknown. Although there are a large number of empirical studies on impacts of minimum 
wages on employment and prices, there are only a few empirical studies on the 
relationship between minimum wages and firm profitability. Recently, Draca et al. (2008) 
showed that the minimum wages reduced firm profitability significantly in UK.  
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In Vietnam, there have been nine times of increasing the minimum wage since the 
year 1993. The real minimum wage increased by around 118 percent during the period 
1994-2009. Increasing minimum wages often leads to debates about impacts of minimum 
wage increases. The government states that minimum wages are constructed with 
consultation from enterprises. Thus increases in minimum wages would have small 
effects on production, business and employment (Duy Tuan, 2009). On the contrary, 
there are critics that increased minimum wages can increase production costs and lead to 
burdens to enterprises (Thai Uyen, 2009). However, there have been no quantitative 
studies on the impact of minimum wage increases on firm profitability in Vietnam. 
The main objective of this paper is to measure the impact of minimum wage 
increases on firm profitability in Vietnam. The method of impact measurement used in 
this paper is difference-in-differences with propensity score matching, and the data are 
from Enterprise Censuses (EC) of Vietnam in years 2005 and 2006. These censuses were  
conducted by General Statistics Office of Vietnam. The censuses covered all State 
enterprises, collectives, private and foreign enterprises throughout the country. The 
number of observations in the 2005 and 2006 ECs is 113,352 and 131,975, respectively. 
It is interesting that we are able to construct a panel data set of 97,306 enterprises through 
these ECs. The EC contains data on the main production and business characteristics of 
enterprises such as labor, labor cost, investment capital, assets, revenues and profits, taxes 
and other contributions to State, etc.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
minimum wages in Vietnam. Section 3 describes the methodology of impact evaluation. 
Section 4 presents impacts of the minimum wage increase on firm profitability. Finally, 
section 5 concludes.  
 
2. Minimum wage and enterprises in Vietnam 
 
According to the Labor Law of Vietnam, the minimum wage is set up to cover “the basis 
of the cost of living of an employee who is employed in the most basic job with normal 
working conditions, and includes remuneration for the work performed and an additional 
amount for contribution towards savings”. It should be noted that Vietnam has only 
minimum monthly wage, not minimum daily or hourly wage. The Labor Law of Vietnam 
also regulates that the government must adjust the minimum wage when “the price index 
increases, resulting in the reduction of the real wages of employees”. In addition, 
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minimum wage adjustments are also based on payment capacity of the State budget, since 
there are a large proportion of employees in the State sector.  
Since the year 1993, there were nine adjustments of the minimum monthly wage 
in Vietnam. All of these adjustments are increases in the minimum wage. The time and 
the national minimum wages (both nominal and real) after the adjustments are presented 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1: Minimum monthly wage in Vietnam (thousand VND) 
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In this paper, we will examine the impacts of the increased in the national 
minimum wage from 290 to 350 thousand VND in October 2005, since the data available 
at the time of writing the paper are Enterprise Censuses 2005 and 2006. Because of firm-
level data, there are no data on wages of individual laborers, thus no data on the number 
of laborers paid below minimum wages. Instead, we have data on the average wages of 
firms’ laborers. Firms that have the average wages of laborers below increased minimum 
wages will be affected by minimum wage increases. In this paper, we assume that firms 
with the average wages of laborers below 350 thousand VND can be affected as the 
minimum wage increased from 290 to 350 thousand VND, and these firms are regarded 
as a treatment group.  
A problem in measuring the impact of minimum wage increases is how to define 
a control group which is not affected by minimum wage increases. A large number of 
State enterprises construct their salary scale for laborers according to minimum wages. It 
means that as minimum wages increase laborers in State enterprises who have wages 
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above the new minimum wages might also receive higher wages or higher social 
insurances. For foreign firms, there are different minimum wages, which are higher than 
the national minimum wages.  Thus the control group should not include the State firms 
as well as the foreign firms. Figure 1 displays the distribution of firms by their average 
labor wages. For all enterprises including State, private and foreign ones, around 8.2 
percent of the enterprises have the average wage below 350 thousand VND in 2005. 
When the State firms and the foreign firms are excluded, this percentage is around 6.6 
percent. The two panels of Figure 2 show very similar distributions. However, in 2006, 
there were still 2.8 percent of private firms the average wage below 350 thousand VND. 
It means that there were firms which paid their workers below minimum wages. This 
figure casts doubt on the effectiveness of minimum wages in Vietnam.  
 
Figure 2: Distribution of the average labor wage 
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Source: Estimation from EC 2005. 
 Private firms which have average wages of laborers above 350 thousand VND can 
be affected by the minimum wage increase, since these firms can have laborers paid 
below 350 thousand VND. However, it is expected that firms with high average labor 
wages are less likely to have laborers with wages below 350 thousand VND, thus less 
likely to be affected by the minimum wage increase. We will use different thresholds to 
define the control groups to examine the sensitivity of impact estimates of the minimum 
wage increase to the definition of control groups. More specifically, control groups 
include private firms which have the average wages for laborers higher than different 
thresholds: 350, 600, 800, 1000, and 1200 thousand VND.   
 To short, the treatment and control groups in this paper are private firms. The 
treatment group includes firms having the average wages below 350 thousand VND in 
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the year 2005, while the control group includes firms having the average wages above 
different thresholds ranging from 350 to 1200 thousand VND in the year 2005. 
 
3. Impact evaluation method 
 
It is not possible to attribute the differences in profitability between enterprises having 
labor wages below the minimum wage and other enterprises to the effect of a minimum 
wage increase, since the two groups are likely to differ in other respects. To measure the 
impact of the minimum wage increase on the firm profitability, we used the methodology 
of difference-in-indifferences with propensity score matching. In the following section, 
we discuss this method and the indicators used.  
Let D be a binary variable, which is equal to 1 if a firm has labor wages below the 
minimum wage, and 0 otherwise. Further, denote Y as the variable of interest, with  
1i iY Y=  if firm i has average labor wages below the minimum wage and 0i iY Y=  if the same 
firm i had not had average labor wages below the minimum wage. The outcome of 
interest in this paper is profit margin which is equal to the ratio of profits to sales.  
The impact of the minimum wage increase on firm i is then measured by: 
                                                            01 iii YY −=∆ .            (1) 
The most popular parameter in impact evaluation is Average Treatment Effect on the 
Treated, which is defined by (Heckman et. al., 1999):  
                                   )1()1()1( 0101 =−===−= DYEDYEDYYEATT .          (2) 
ATT measures the average effect of the minimum wage increase on firms with the 
average wage below the minimum wage. 
 Estimation of ATT is not straightforward, since )1|( 0 =DYE  is unobservable. 
)1|( 0 =DYE  is the counterfactual which is the expected profit margins of treatment firms  
if these firm had the average wage above the minimum wage. We use a matching 
methodology to derive a comparison group, which can mimic the treatment group in the 
absence of the minimum wage increase. We use the method of propensity score matching 
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). We start by estimating the probability of being a firm 
having the average wage for laborers below the minimum wage using a logit or probit 
model (this is called propensity scores), 1( 1) ( )it itP D F X −= = , where X is a vector of 
observed variables before the minimum wage increases. The matching methodology 
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matches each firm having the average wage for laborers below the minimum wage to 
“comparable” firms having the average wage for laborers above the minimum wage 
based on the closeness of the predicted propensity scores. The matching estimator is 
defined as follows: 
        ( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈ 







−=
Treatmenti Controlj
jjii yppgyTTA ˆ,ˆˆ ,   (3) 
where p is predicted propensity scores and g(.) gives the weights on control firm j in 
forming a comparison with treated firm i. The function g(.) differs for the different 
matching estimators proposed in the literature.  
 Since we have longitudinal data on enterprises, we can estimate the impact of the 
minimum wage increase by using the method of difference-in-differences with matching. 
The main advantage of the difference-in differences method compared to the standard 
matching estimator in levels is that the former eliminates differences in the variable of 
interest due to unobserved time-invariant effects. This implies that the difference-in 
differences method controls for selection on both observables and time-invariant 
unobservables, while the standard matching method controls for selection on observables 
only. Let y∆ be the differences between the variable of interest before and after the 
minimum wage increase. Then the difference-in-differences estimator is given by: 
                                             ( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈ 







∆−∆=
Treatmenti Controlj
jjii yppgyTTA ˆ,ˆˆ .           (4) 
We use different matching estimators including nearest-neighbors and kernel matching to 
examine the sensitivity the impact estimates. Standard errors are calculated using 
bootstrap techniques. This is common practice in empirical studies. Although Abadie and 
Imbens (2006) show that bootstrap can give invalid standard errors for the nearest 
neighbor matching estimator, and there is no evidence on the validity of bootstrap 
standard errors for other matching estimators.  
 
4. Impact estimation results  
 
4.1. Performance of matching 
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As mentioned above, this paper examines the impact of the increase in the minimum 
wage from 290 to 350 thousand VND in October 2005. The EC data in 2005 are used as 
the baseline data before the minimum wage increase. The minimum wage increase came 
into effect from October 2005, and the effect of the minimum wage increase on the firm 
profitability of the whole year 2005 would be very negligible. We do not use the 2004 EC 
as baseline data since the wage and profitability can be changed substantially during 
2004-2005. The 2006 EC data are used as data after the minimum wage increase.  
The first step in measuring impact is to predict the propensity score, which is the 
probability that a firm had the average wages of laborers below 350 thousand VND in 
2005. Since the dependent variable is binary, we used logit regression. Control variables 
should affect both the firm profitability and the average wage of firms’ laborers. The 
control variables should be exogenous to the treatment variable, thus these variables were 
measured in 2005, i.e., before the minimum wage increases in October 2005. Pre-
treatment outcome (profit margin in 2005) can be used as control in the regression of the 
propensity score (Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005). Table A1 in the 
Appendix presents the entire set of explanatory variables, and their means and standard 
errors of the means.  
Table 1 presents the logit regressions of the probability that a firm had the average 
wages of laborers below 350 thousand VND in 2005. It shows that firms in the fishery 
and transportation sector are less likely to pay low wages for their employees. On the 
contrary, firms in sectors of manufacture, construction and hotels tend to have the 
average wages for workers below the minimum wage. As expected, firms with a large 
number of employees are more likely to have lower wages for their employees. Higher 
values of fixed assets and revenues tend to reduce the probability of having the average 
wages of laborers below the minimum wage. As expected, workers in urban areas and the 
rich cities, Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh city. 
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Table 1: Logit regression 
 
Explanatory variables 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
350 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
600 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
800 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
1000 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
1200 
thousand 
VND 
Agriculture 0.1781 0.2512 0.3235* 0.4159** 0.5281** 
 
[0.1533] [0.1640] [0.1779] [0.1971] [0.2179] 
Fishery -0.2952** -0.3553*** -0.4216*** -0.4872*** -0.5137*** 
 
[0.1172] [0.1209] [0.1264] [0.1361] [0.1456] 
Mining  -0.0139 -0.0256 -0.0616 -0.0827 -0.1188 
 
[0.1036] [0.1079] [0.1131] [0.1217] [0.1291] 
Manufacture 0.3040*** 0.3576*** 0.4097*** 0.4989*** 0.5928*** 
 
[0.0364] [0.0377] [0.0395] [0.0420] [0.0446] 
Electricity, water 0.0222 0.0263 0.0856 0.1647 0.2269 
 [0.1316] [0.1378] [0.1493] [0.1657] [0.1813] 
Construction 0.0973** 0.0804** 0.0542 0.0088 0.0231 
 
[0.0391] [0.0404] [0.0421] [0.0443] [0.0466] 
Trade -0.0055 -0.0063 0.0104 0.0652* 0.1172*** 
 
[0.0346] [0.0357] [0.0373] [0.0392] [0.0411] 
Hotel 0.5801*** 0.6913*** 0.9193*** 1.3146*** 1.6607*** 
 
[0.0741] [0.0766] [0.0806] [0.0871] [0.0949] 
Transportation -0.2364*** -0.2826*** -0.3786*** -0.5200*** -0.6220*** 
 
[0.0547] [0.0561] [0.0578] [0.0604] [0.0635] 
Finance 0.1952 0.2174 0.2248 0.3272 0.4078 
 [0.2143] [0.2254] [0.2381] [0.2647] [0.2900] 
Private enterprises Omitted     
 
     
Limited liability company -0.0047 -0.0166 -0.0546* -0.1320*** -0.1878*** 
 [0.0255] [0.0266] [0.0280] [0.0305] [0.0330] 
Joint-stock company 0.0873** 0.0881** 0.0742* -0.0117 -0.0547 
 
[0.0360] [0.0375] [0.0395] [0.0425] [0.0456] 
Joint-stock company with less than 50% 
State capital  -0.2505** -0.2853** -0.3505*** -0.4319*** -0.6095*** 
 [0.1159] [0.1191] [0.1238] [0.1338] [0.1424] 
Number of laborers 0.0008*** 0.0011*** 0.0013*** 0.0019*** 0.0026*** 
 
[0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0001] [0.0002] [0.0002] 
Fixed assets (billion VND) -0.0188*** -0.0223*** -0.0237*** -0.0313*** -0.0312*** 
 
[0.0045] [0.0047] [0.0049] [0.0055] [0.0057] 
Basic construction capital (billion VND) 0.0092* 0.0082* 0.0069 0.0041 0.0044 
 
[0.0047] [0.0048] [0.0049] [0.0053] [0.0066] 
Revenues (billion VND) -0.0347*** -0.0400*** -0.0447*** -0.0494*** -0.0528*** 
 [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0019] [0.0020] [0.0021] 
Red River Delta Omitted     
      
North East -0.1257*** -0.1766*** -0.1858*** -0.2122*** -0.1896*** 
 [0.0425] [0.0448] [0.0480] [0.0531] [0.0583] 
North West -0.1066 -0.1809* -0.2605** -0.3351*** -0.3687*** 
 [0.0959] [0.0998] [0.1043] [0.1132] [0.1215] 
North Central Coast -0.1665*** -0.2117*** -0.2241*** -0.2449*** -0.2234*** 
 [0.0470] [0.0497] [0.0533] [0.0594] [0.0657] 
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Explanatory variables 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
350 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
600 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
800 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
1000 
thousand 
VND 
Control 
group having 
monthly 
wage above 
1200 
thousand 
VND 
South Central Coast  -0.2041*** -0.2638*** -0.3048*** -0.3689*** -0.3460*** 
 [0.0421] [0.0444] [0.0472] [0.0522] [0.0573] 
Central Highlands -0.2523*** -0.3237*** -0.3290*** -0.4017*** -0.4741*** 
 [0.0690] [0.0718] [0.0770] [0.0842] [0.0907] 
South East -0.3594*** -0.4682*** -0.5647*** -0.7169*** -0.7927*** 
 [0.0424] [0.0443] [0.0468] [0.0511] [0.0549] 
Mekong River Delta -0.4173*** -0.4672*** -0.4933*** -0.5447*** -0.5441*** 
 [0.0459] [0.0483] [0.0519] [0.0576] [0.0633] 
Urban -0.1417*** -0.1799*** -0.2348*** -0.2849*** -0.3071*** 
 [0.0246] [0.0258] [0.0275] [0.0301] [0.0327] 
HCM city  -0.1549*** -0.1668*** -0.1809*** -0.2304*** -0.2871*** 
 [0.0412] [0.0424] [0.0442] [0.0472] [0.0499] 
Hanoi  -0.7403*** -0.8317*** -0.8915*** -1.0531*** -1.1289*** 
 [0.0358] [0.0375] [0.0397] [0.0433] [0.0468] 
Constant -0.9876*** -0.7762*** -0.5259*** -0.1644*** 0.0692 
 [0.0468] [0.0492] [0.0521] [0.0567] [0.0610] 
Observations 43793 38160 31732 25351 20553 
R-squared 0.09 0.11 0.14 0.18 0.22 
Robust standard errors in brackets 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
 
To examine the common support, we present Figures 3 of the propensity scores.  
The bars above the horizontal line represent the density distribution of the propensity 
score of firms with the average wages of laborers below the minimum wage, while the 
bars below the horizontal line represent the density distribution of the propensity score of 
firms with the average wages of laborers above the minimum wage. The figure shows 
that the common support is large. This means that for each treated firm we will be able to 
find non-treated firms with similar propensity scores.  
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Figure 3: Predicted propensity scores 
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Source: Estimation from EC 2005 
   It should be noted that the main aim of the predicted propensity score is to 
overcome the multidimensionality problem of matching by covariates. The quality of a 
constructed comparison group should be assessed by testing whether the distribution of 
the covariates is similar between the comparison and treatment groups given the 
predicted propensity score. We test the equality of means of covariates between treatment 
and comparison firms using t-tests. To examine the sensitivity of the impact estimates to 
different matching schemes, we will use three matching estimators including 1 nearest 
neighbor, 5 nearest neighbors, kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.05. The results of the 
balancing test for these estimators are presented in Tables A3 to A10 in Appendix I. It 
can be seen that the number of covariates that we cannot reject the equality of their means 
between treatment and comparison groups is higher kernel matching. So we will use the 
results from the kernel matching scheme in the remainder of this paper the interpretation. 
Results from other nearest neighbor estimators are very similar and presented in 
Appendix 1.  
 
4.2. Impact estimates 
 
Table 2 present impact estimates of the minimum wage increase on profit margin using 
kernel neighbor matching with bandwidth of 0.05. Before the minimum wage increase, 
firms having the average labor wages below the minimum wage have higher profit 
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margin than firms having the average labor wages above the minimum wage. This is 
reasonable, since the low wages for laborers imply low production costs and higher ratios 
of profit to revenues. After the minimum wage increase, the control group still have 
higher profit margin than the treatment group. However, the difference is smaller and not 
statistically significant. Overall, the estimates of the impact on the profit margins from 
the difference-in-differences estimator are negative but not statistically significant. The 
size of the estimates is very small.  
 
Table 2: Impact of the minimum wage increase on profit margin – kernel neighbor 
matching with bandwidth of 0.05 
 
Control group 
Before the minimum wage increase After the minimum wage increase Diff-in-diff 
Y1 Y0 Y1-Y0 Y1 Y0 Y1-Y0 
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(4)-(5) (7)=(6)-(3) 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
350 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02066*** 0.00056*** 0.02305*** 0.02284*** 0.00021 -0.00035 
[0.00078] [0.00133] [0.00082] [0.00075] [0.00091] [0.00108] [0.00107] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
600 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02063*** 0.00058*** 0.02305*** 0.02265*** 0.00040 -0.00018 
[0.00078] [0.00129] [0.00080] [0.00075] [0.00093] [0.00112] [0.00107] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
800 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02045*** 0.00077*** 0.02305*** 0.02283*** 0.00022 -0.00055 
[0.00078] [0.00126] [0.00079] [0.00075] [0.00095] [0.00112] [0.00110] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
1000 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.01983*** 0.00138*** 0.02305*** 0.02230*** 0.00074 -0.00064 
[0.00078] [0.00121] [0.00088] [0.00075] [0.00101] [0.00118] [0.00123] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
1200 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.01931*** 0.00190*** 0.02305*** 0.02178*** 0.00127 -0.00063 
[0.00078] [0.00119] [0.00092] [0.00075] [0.00128] [0.00143] [0.00147] 
The outcome variable is the ratio of net profit to total sales revenues. The net profit is the difference between total sales 
revenue and total costs of firms. 
Y1 is the outcome of the treatment group which includes private firms having the average wages below 350 thousand VND 
in the year 2005 
Y0 is the outcome of the control group which includes private firms having the average wages above different thresholds 
ranging from 350 to 1200 thousand VND in the year 2005 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in bracket (Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications). 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Minimum wages are set up to protect low wage workers from exploitation. In Vietnam, 
there have been nine increases of the minimum wage since the year 1993. The real 
minimum wage increased by around 118 percent during the period 1994-2009. Increasing 
minimum wages is sometime to blame for reducing firm profitability. Higher minimum 
wages implies higher costs and smaller profit margins. This paper is the first attempt to 
examine the impact of the minimum wage increases on firm profitability. More 
specifically, this paper use data from Vietnam Enterprise Census 2005 and 2006 to 
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measure the impact of the minimum wage increase from 290 to 350 thousand VND in 
2005 on profit margins of private firms. The impact measurement method is the 
difference-in-differences with propensity score matching.  
We found that the effect of the increase in the minimum wage on firm 
profitability is very small. It reduces the firms’ profit margins around 1 percent. In 
addition, the impact estimate is not statistically significant. There can be several 
explanations for the small and insignificant effect. Firstly, firms are able to adjust the 
higher costs due to increased minimum wages so that their profit margins are not affected 
significantly by the minimum wage increase. Secondly, the minimum wages are not 
effective in Vietnam. As mentioned in section 2, there were at least still 2.8 percent of 
private firms which paid their employees below the minimum wage in 2006. Some firms 
do not follow the minimum wages, thus increased minimum wages do not affect their 
profitability. Thirdly, there can be measurement errors in our data sets. Enterprise census 
data often have larger measurement errors. In addition, our definition of the treatment 
variable does not capture the variation of firms’ exposure to the minimum wage increase. 
For example, it is better if the treatment variable is the number of laborers with wages 
below the minimum level. Finding explanations for the small estimate of the impact of 
increased minimum wages on the firm profitability is beyond the scope of this study, but 
certainly important for future research.  
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Appendix 1: Tables 
 
Table A.1. Variable description 
 
Variable Type Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Agriculture Binary 0.0052 0.0719 0.0030 0.0548 
Fishery Binary 0.0062 0.0787 0.0115 0.1066 
Mining  Binary 0.0104 0.1014 0.0079 0.0884 
Manufacture Binary 0.3004 0.4585 0.1977 0.3982 
Electricity, water Binary 0.0059 0.0765 0.0050 0.0704 
Construction Binary 0.1715 0.3770 0.1309 0.3373 
Trade Binary 0.3288 0.4699 0.4789 0.4996 
Hotel Binary 0.0721 0.2587 0.0403 0.1967 
Transportation Binary 0.1008 0.3012 0.0921 0.2891 
Finance Binary 0.0024 0.0492 0.0020 0.0445 
Private enterprises Binary 0.2789 0.4486 0.2230 0.4163 
Limited liability company Binary 0.5696 0.4952 0.6199 0.4854 
Joint-stock company Binary 0.1452 0.3523 0.1400 0.3470 
Joint-stock company with less than 50% 
State capital  Binary 0.0062 0.0787 0.0171 0.1298 
Number of laborers Continuous 29.0 79.0 33.8 125.4 
Fixed assets (million VND) Continuous 781.4 2970.0 1650.8 9284.4 
Basic construction capital (million VND) Continuous 193.7 1458.7 185.0 2391.3 
Revenues (million VND) Continuous 1783.6 7991.2 11607.6 93034.9 
Red River Delta Binary 0.3306 0.4705 0.3554 0.4786 
North East Binary 0.0936 0.2913 0.0553 0.2285 
North West  Binary 0.0132 0.1140 0.0072 0.0846 
North Central Coast  Binary 0.0686 0.2528 0.0425 0.2016 
South Central Coast  Binary 0.0929 0.2903 0.0642 0.2452 
Central Highlands Binary 0.0243 0.1539 0.0190 0.1365 
South East Binary 0.3053 0.4606 0.3795 0.4853 
Mekong River Delta Binary 0.0717 0.2581 0.0769 0.2664 
Urban  Binary 0.6791 0.4669 0.7976 0.4018 
HCM city  Binary 0.2249 0.4176 0.3039 0.4599 
Hanoi Binary 0.1195 0.3245 0.2575 0.4373 
Number of observations   2886  40907 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
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Table A.2. Balancing tests for 1 nearest neighbor matching 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Agriculture Unmatched 0.00520 0.00301 3.4  2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.00520 0.00381 2.2 36.7 0.76 0.447 
Fishery Unmatched 0.00624 0.01149 -5.6  -2.60 0.009 
 Matched 0.00624 0.00485 1.5 73.6 0.69 0.493 
Mining  Unmatched 0.01040 0.00787 2.7  1.47 0.142 
 Matched 0.01040 0.01282 -2.5 3.9 -0.83 0.406 
Manufacture Unmatched 0.30042 0.19767 23.9  13.25 0.000 
 Matched 0.30042 0.32779 -6.4 73.4 -2.17 0.030 
Electricity, water Unmatched 0.00589 0.00499 1.2  0.66 0.508 
 Matched 0.00589 0.00866 -3.8 -206.8 -1.20 0.231 
Construction Unmatched 0.17152 0.13093 11.3  6.20 0.000 
 Matched 0.17152 0.16008 3.2 71.8 1.13 0.259 
Trade Unmatched 0.32883 0.47892 -30.9  -15.66 0.000 
 Matched 0.32883 0.30180 5.6 82.0 2.14 0.033 
Hotel Unmatched 0.07207 0.04034 13.8  8.18 0.000 
 Matched 0.07207 0.08004 -3.5 74.9 -1.10 0.270 
Transportation Unmatched 0.10083 0.09206 3.0  1.57 0.116 
 Matched 0.10083 0.10326 -0.8 72.3 -0.29 0.769 
Finance Unmatched 0.00243 0.00198 0.9  0.52 0.606 
 Matched 0.00243 0.00208 0.7 22.2 0.27 0.788 
Limited liability company Unmatched 0.56965 0.61987 -10.2  -5.36 0.000 
 Matched 0.56965 0.55371 3.3 68.3 1.18 0.238 
Joint-stock company Unmatched 0.14518 0.14000 1.5  0.77 0.438 
 Matched 0.14518 0.15974 -4.2 -180.8 -1.49 0.137 
Joint-stock company 
with less than 50% State 
capital  
Unmatched 0.00624 0.01714 -10.2  -4.45 0.000 
 Matched 0.00624 0.00624 0.0 100.0 0.00 1.000 
Number of laborers Unmatched 29.043 33.754 -4.5  -1.99 0.047 
 Matched 29.043 36.217 -6.8 -52.3 -1.91 0.056 
Fixed assets (billion 
VND) Unmatched 0.78140 1.65080 -12.6  -5.01 0.000 
 Matched 0.78140 0.93703 -2.3 82.1 -1.98 0.048 
Basic construction 
capital (billion VND) Unmatched 0.19365 0.18503 0.4  0.19 0.848 
 Matched 0.19365 0.27935 -4.3 -893.7 -0.93 0.351 
Revenues (billion VND) Unmatched 1.78360 11.60800 -14.9  -5.67 0.000 
 Matched 1.78360 2.82780 -1.6 89.4 -4.78 0.000 
North East Unmatched 0.09356 0.05527 14.6  8.52 0.000 
 Matched 0.09356 0.10049 -2.6 81.9 -0.86 0.390 
North West Unmatched 0.01317 0.00721 5.9  3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.01317 0.01282 0.3 94.2 0.11 0.911 
North Central Coast Unmatched 0.06861 0.04246 11.4  6.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.06861 0.06930 -0.3 97.3 -0.10 0.920 
South Central Coast  Unmatched 0.09286 0.06424 10.7  5.98 0.000 
 Matched 0.09286 0.09806 -1.9 81.8 -0.65 0.516 
Central Highlands Unmatched 0.02426 0.01899 3.6  1.98 0.047 
 Matched 0.02426 0.02772 -2.4 34.1 -0.80 0.424 
South East Unmatched 0.30527 0.37949 -15.7  -7.97 0.000 
 19
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
 Matched 0.30527 0.29279 2.6 83.2 1.00 0.317 
Mekong River Delta Unmatched 0.07173 0.07691 -2.0  -1.01 0.312 
 Matched 0.07173 0.05925 4.8 -140.8 1.85 0.064 
Urban Unmatched 0.67914 0.79759 -27.2  -15.13 0.000 
 Matched 0.67914 0.66424 3.4 87.4 1.17 0.244 
HCM city  Unmatched 0.22488 0.30386 -18.0  -8.97 0.000 
 Matched 0.22488 0.20825 3.8 78.9 1.48 0.138 
Hanoi  Unmatched 0.11954 0.25754 -35.8  -16.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.11954 0.10880 2.8 92.2 1.24 0.215 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 20
Table A.3. Balancing tests for 5 nearest neighbor matching 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Agriculture Unmatched 0.00520 0.00301 3.4  2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.00520 0.00430 1.4 58.9 0.74 0.457 
Fishery Unmatched 0.00624 0.01149 -5.6  -2.60 0.009 
 Matched 0.00624 0.00326 3.2 43.3 2.46 0.014 
Mining  Unmatched 0.01040 0.00787 2.7  1.47 0.142 
 Matched 0.01040 0.01026 0.1 94.5 0.08 0.938 
Manufacture Unmatched 0.30042 0.19767 23.9  13.25 0.000 
 Matched 0.30042 0.32571 -5.9 75.4 -3.10 0.002 
Electricity, water Unmatched 0.00589 0.00499 1.2  0.66 0.508 
 Matched 0.00589 0.00644 -0.8 38.6 -0.40 0.687 
Construction Unmatched 0.17152 0.13093 11.3  6.20 0.000 
 Matched 0.17152 0.16417 2.1 81.9 1.12 0.264 
Trade Unmatched 0.32883 0.47892 -30.9  -15.66 0.000 
 Matched 0.32883 0.30395 5.1 83.4 3.04 0.002 
Hotel Unmatched 0.07207 0.04034 13.8  8.18 0.000 
 Matched 0.07207 0.08420 -5.3 61.8 -2.57 0.010 
Transportation Unmatched 0.10083 0.09206 3.0  1.57 0.116 
 Matched 0.10083 0.10866 -2.7 10.7 -1.45 0.146 
Finance Unmatched 0.00243 0.00198 0.9  0.52 0.606 
 Matched 0.00243 0.00194 1.0 -8.9 0.59 0.555 
Limited liability company Unmatched 0.56965 0.61987 -10.2  -5.36 0.000 
 Matched 0.56965 0.55024 4.0 61.4 2.22 0.026 
Joint-stock company Unmatched 0.14518 0.14000 1.5  0.77 0.438 
 Matched 0.14518 0.15288 -2.2 -48.4 -1.23 0.220 
Joint-stock company 
with less than 50% State 
capital  
Unmatched 0.00624 0.01714 -10.2  -4.45 0.000 
 Matched 0.00624 0.00700 -0.7 93.0 -0.53 0.593 
Number of laborers Unmatched 29.043 33.754 -4.5  -1.99 0.047 
 Matched 29.043 34.292 -5.0 -11.4 -2.48 0.013 
Fixed assets (billion 
VND) Unmatched 0.78140 1.65080 -12.6  -5.01 0.000 
 Matched 0.78140 0.93694 -2.3 82.1 -3.09 0.002 
Basic construction 
capital (billion VND) Unmatched 0.19365 0.18503 0.4  0.19 0.848 
 Matched 0.19365 0.18600 0.4 11.3 0.19 0.853 
Revenues (billion VND) Unmatched 1.78360 11.60800 -14.9  -5.67 0.000 
 Matched 1.78360 2.84140 -1.6 89.2 -7.50 0.000 
North East Unmatched 0.09356 0.05527 14.6  8.52 0.000 
 Matched 0.09356 0.09550 -0.7 94.9 -0.38 0.706 
North West Unmatched 0.01317 0.00721 5.9  3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.01317 0.01525 -2.1 65.1 -1.00 0.318 
North Central Coast Unmatched 0.06861 0.04246 11.4  6.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.06861 0.06722 0.6 94.7 0.31 0.754 
South Central Coast  Unmatched 0.09286 0.06424 10.7  5.98 0.000 
 Matched 0.09286 0.09619 -1.2 88.4 -0.65 0.518 
Central Highlands Unmatched 0.02426 0.01899 3.6  1.98 0.047 
 Matched 0.02426 0.02682 -1.8 51.3 -0.92 0.356 
South East Unmatched 0.30527 0.37949 -15.7  -7.97 0.000 
 Matched 0.30527 0.28836 3.6 77.2 2.10 0.035 
 21
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Mekong River Delta Unmatched 0.07173 0.07691 -2.0  -1.01 0.312 
 Matched 0.07173 0.06493 2.6 -31.1 1.53 0.126 
Urban Unmatched 0.67914 0.79759 -27.2  -15.13 0.000 
 Matched 0.67914 0.66376 3.5 87.0 1.86 0.063 
HCM city  Unmatched 0.22488 0.30386 -18.0  -8.97 0.000 
 Matched 0.22488 0.21040 3.3 81.7 1.99 0.046 
Hanoi  Unmatched 0.11954 0.25754 -35.8  -16.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.11954 0.10631 3.4 90.4 2.38 0.018 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
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Table A.4. Balancing tests for kernel matching with bandwidth of 0.05 
 
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Agriculture Unmatched 0.00520 0.00301 3.4  2.03 0.042 
 Matched 0.00520 0.00490 0.5 86.4 0.44 0.663 
Fishery Unmatched 0.00624 0.01149 -5.6  -2.60 0.009 
 Matched 0.00624 0.00584 0.4 92.5 0.53 0.594 
Mining  Unmatched 0.01040 0.00787 2.7  1.47 0.142 
 Matched 0.01040 0.01032 0.1 96.7 0.08 0.935 
Manufacture Unmatched 0.30042 0.19767 23.9  13.25 0.000 
 Matched 0.30017 0.30036 0.0 99.8 0.01 0.990 
Electricity, water Unmatched 0.00589 0.00499 1.2  0.66 0.508 
 Matched 0.00589 0.00577 0.2 86.2 0.17 0.866 
Construction Unmatched 0.17152 0.13093 11.3  6.20 0.000 
 Matched 0.17158 0.16955 0.6 95.0 0.55 0.585 
Trade Unmatched 0.32883 0.47892 -30.9  -15.66 0.000 
 Matched 0.32894 0.33468 -1.2 96.2 -1.30 0.194 
Hotel Unmatched 0.07207 0.04034 13.8  8.18 0.000 
 Matched 0.07210 0.07213 0.0 99.9 -0.02 0.982 
Transportation Unmatched 0.10083 0.09206 3.0  1.57 0.116 
 Matched 0.10087 0.10236 -0.5 83.0 -0.53 0.597 
Finance Unmatched 0.00243 0.00198 0.9  0.52 0.606 
 Matched 0.00243 0.00220 0.5 48.3 0.50 0.617 
Limited liability company Unmatched 0.56965 0.61987 -10.2  -5.36 0.000 
 Matched 0.56984 0.56682 0.6 94.0 0.60 0.551 
Joint-stock company Unmatched 0.14518 0.14000 1.5  0.77 0.438 
 Matched 0.14523 0.15025 -1.4 3.3 -1.49 0.135 
Joint-stock company 
with less than 50% State 
capital  
Unmatched 0.00624 0.01714 -10.2  -4.45 0.000 
 Matched 0.00624 0.00791 -1.6 84.7 -2.09 0.037 
Number of laborers Unmatched 29.043 33.754 -4.5  -1.99 0.047 
 Matched 28.533 30.377 -1.8 60.9 -1.48 0.139 
Fixed assets (billion 
VND) Unmatched 0.78140 1.65080 -12.6  -5.01 0.000 
 Matched 0.78160 1.01430 -3.4 73.2 -6.72 0.000 
Basic construction 
capital (billion VND) Unmatched 0.19365 0.18503 0.4  0.19 0.848 
 Matched 0.19371 0.23659 -2.2 -397.2 -1.52 0.129 
Revenues (billion VND) Unmatched 1.78360 11.60800 -14.9  -5.67 0.000 
 Matched 1.78290 3.79690 -3.1 79.5 -8.06 0.000 
North East Unmatched 0.09356 0.05527 14.6  8.52 0.000 
 Matched 0.09359 0.09246 0.4 97.1 0.39 0.694 
North West Unmatched 0.01317 0.00721 5.9  3.56 0.000 
 Matched 0.01317 0.01280 0.4 93.7 0.34 0.733 
North Central Coast Unmatched 0.06861 0.04246 11.4  6.61 0.000 
 Matched 0.06863 0.06637 1.0 91.4 0.93 0.351 
South Central Coast  Unmatched 0.09286 0.06424 10.7  5.98 0.000 
 Matched 0.09289 0.09043 0.9 91.4 0.88 0.378 
Central Highlands Unmatched 0.02426 0.01899 3.6  1.98 0.047 
 Matched 0.02426 0.02509 -0.6 84.3 -0.56 0.573 
South East Unmatched 0.30527 0.37949 -15.7  -7.97 0.000 
 Matched 0.30537 0.30100 0.9 94.1 0.97 0.332 
 23
Variable Sample Treated Control %bias bias t p>t 
Mekong River Delta Unmatched 0.07173 0.07691 -2.0  -1.01 0.312 
 Matched 0.07175 0.07168 0.0 98.6 0.02 0.985 
Urban Unmatched 0.67914 0.79759 -27.2  -15.13 0.000 
 Matched 0.67938 0.67881 0.1 99.5 0.07 0.941 
HCM city  Unmatched 0.22488 0.30386 -18.0  -8.97 0.000 
 Matched 0.22496 0.21860 1.4 92.0 1.58 0.114 
Hanoi  Unmatched 0.11954 0.25754 -35.8  -16.63 0.000 
 Matched 0.11958 0.12539 -1.5 95.8 -1.87 0.062 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
 
 
 
 
Table A.5. The impact of the minimum wage increase on profit margin – 1 nearest 
neighbor matching  
Control group 
Before the minimum wage increase After the minimum wage increase Diff-in-diff 
Y1 Y0 Y1-Y0 Y1 Y0 Y1-Y0 
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2) (7)=(6)-(3) 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
350 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02056*** 0.00065 0.02305*** 0.02279*** 0.00026 -0.00039 
[0.00078] [0.00154] [0.00118] [0.00075] [0.00124] [0.00134] [0.00141] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
600 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02052*** 0.00069 0.02305*** 0.02256*** 0.00049 -0.00021 
[0.00078] [0.00154] [0.00117] [0.00075] [0.00120] [0.00134] [0.00138] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
800 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02046*** 0.00075 0.02305*** 0.02283*** 0.00022 -0.00053 
[0.00078] [0.00149] [0.00114] [0.00075] [0.00130] [0.00146] [0.00145] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
1000 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.01975*** 0.00147 0.02305*** 0.02205*** 0.00099 -0.00047 
[0.00078] [0.00148] [0.00123] [0.00075] [0.00128] [0.00142] [0.00153] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
1200 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.01936*** 0.00186 0.02305*** 0.02164*** 0.00140 -0.00045 
[0.00078] [0.00147] [0.00124] [0.00075] [0.00143] [0.00157] [0.00165] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in bracket (Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications). 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
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Table A.6. The impact of the minimum wage increase on profit margin – 5 nearest 
neighbor matching  
Control group 
Before the minimum wage increase After the minimum wage increase Diff-in-diff 
Y1 Y0 Y1-Y0 Y1 Y0 Y1-Y0 
(1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5) (6)=(1)-(2) (7)=(6)-(3) 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
350 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02062*** 0.00060 0.02305*** 0.02282*** 0.00023 -0.00037 
[0.00078] [0.00137] [0.00091] [0.00075] [0.00103] [0.00117] [0.00120] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
600 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02059*** 0.00062 0.02305*** 0.02261*** 0.00044 -0.00018 
[0.00078] [0.00134] [0.00090] [0.00075] [0.00101] [0.00119] [0.00116] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
800 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.02042*** 0.00079 0.02305*** 0.02278*** 0.00026 -0.00052 
[0.00078] [0.00132] [0.00090] [0.00075] [0.00106] [0.00124] [0.00123] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
1000 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.01978*** 0.00143 0.02305*** 0.02219*** 0.00086 -0.00057 
[0.00078] [0.00126] [0.00098] [0.00075] [0.00109] [0.00125] [0.00137] 
Control group having 
monthly wage above 
1200 thousand VND 
0.02121*** 0.01932*** 0.00189 0.02305*** 0.02173*** 0.00131 -0.00058 
[0.00078] [0.00130] [0.00106] [0.00075] [0.00134] [0.00150] [0.00152] 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
Standard errors in bracket (Standard errors are calculated using bootstrap with 500 replications). 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
 
 
 
 
Table A.7: Sample description 
 
Type of firms 
Freq. Percent Number 
of 
workers 
in 2005 
Number 
of 
workers 
in 2006 
Revenue 
in 2005 
(million 
VND) 
Revenue 
in 2006 
(million 
VND) 
Profit 
margin in 
2005 
Profit 
margin in 
2006 
         
Firms in 2005 
but not in 2006 15,709 10.69 46.0 na. 17177 na. 0.024 na. 
Firms in 2006 
but not in 2005 33,998 23.13 na. 22.9 na. 10476 na. 0.024 
Firms in both 
2005 and 2006 97,306 66.19 56.8 59.1 20404 24501 0.029 0.033 
         
na. means ‘not available’, since there is no data. 
Source: Estimation from ECs 2005 and 2006 
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Appendix 2: Propensity score matching estimators 
 
In the matching estimator (equation 4): 
                                             ( )∑ ∑
∈ ∈ 







∆−∆=
Treatmenti Controlj
jjii yppgyTTA ˆ,ˆˆ ,   
The weights are defined non-negative and sum up to 1, i.e.: ( ) 1ˆ,ˆ =∑
∈Controlj
ji ppg .   
If each participant is matched with the one non-participant with the minimum 
value of d(i,j) (where d(i,j) is the distance between the propensity scores of participant i 
and that of non-participant j), the weight ( )ji ppg ˆ,ˆ  equals 1 for all pairs of matches. This 
is called one nearest neighbor matching. When more than one non-participants are 
matched with each participant (or vice versa), we need some ways to define the weights 
attached to each non-participant.  
A number of methods use equal weights for all matches. N-nearest neighbors 
matching involves matching each participant with n non-participants whose have the 
closest propensity scores. Each matched non-participant will receive weight 
( ) nppg ji /1ˆ,ˆ = .4 However, it could be reasonable to assign different weights to different 
non-participants depending on metric distances between their covariates and the 
covariates of the matched participant (see, e.g., Heckman, et al., 1997; Smith and Todd, 
2005). The kernel matching method matches a participant with one or many non-
participants depending a kernel function and a selected bandwidth h. The kernel functions 
for kernel is the Epanechnikov (default in psmatch2). 
        
 
 
                                                 
4
 Caliper matching (see, e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 1998; Smith and Todd, 2005) uses equal weights for 
matched subjects whose distance d(i,j) is smaller than a specific value, say 0.05 or 0.1. This criterion aims 
to ensure the quality of matching. Stratification (interval) matching divides the range of estimated distances 
into several strata (blocks) of equal ranges. Within each stratum, a participant is matched with all non-
participants with equal weights (see, e.g., Dehejia and Wahba, 1998); Smith and Todd, 2005). 
